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C.2d
F. No.

Estate of JANE L.
Deceased. BOARD OF
TRUSTEES OF THE LELAND S'l'ANFORD JUNIOR
UNIVERSITY
v. AIMEE G.
REYNOLDS
Wills-Estate or
Contingent Gifts.-In
of a bequest,
vesting of title
the primary common-law rule in
in remaindermen and the Dr4~fererwe for vested rather than
contingent remainders is
established. (Prob. Code,
§§ 28, 123.)
[2] Remainders -Vested and Contingent Remainders. -A remainder limited without words of condition to a class of
persons, such as "children," one or more of whom are in existence and ascertained, is vested, though subject to be divested
in part by the coming into existence or ascertainment of other
members of the class.
[3a, 3b] Id.-Vested and Contingent Remainders.-The mere fact
that takers of a postponed gift are described by a class designation such as children, grandchildren, nieces, nephews and
the like does not give rise to any implied condition of survival;
a gift of a future interest to a class may be vested in interest
though possession and enjoyment are postponed, the whole concept of a remainder vested subject to open being based on such
view. (Disapproving Estate of Cavarly, 119 Cal. 406 [51 P.
429]; Estate of Clark, 64 Cal.App.2d 636 [149 P.2d 465];
Estate of Blake, 157 Cal. 448 [108 P. 287]; and Estate of
Hamon, 136 Cal.App. 517 [29 P.2d 326].)
[4] Wills-Estate or Interest Passing Under Will-Vested and
Contingent Gifts.-If a testator expressly provides that a class
gift is to vest prior to the time when the class closes, his
intent will be effectuated.
[5] Id.-Estate or Interest Passing Under Will-Vested and Contingent Gifts.-As to devises of land, there is no presumption
that, in a gift to a class where distribution is postponed, there
(1] See Cal.Jur.,
§ 291 et seq.; Am.Jur., Wills, § 1218.
[2] See Oal.Jur.2d, Life
Remainders and Reversions,
§ 22 et seq.; Am.Jur., Life Estates, Remainders and Reversions,
§ 66 et seq.
McK. Dig. References: [1] Wills,§ 382; [2, 3] Remainders,§ 4;
[4] Wills, §381; [5] Wills, §380; [6-8] Wills, §386; [9, 11] Adoption, §30; [10] Adoption, §39; [12, 13] Wills, §329; [14, 15]
Adoption, § 37; [16] Wills, § 266.
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that the members of the class must
of distribution;
courts may
a condition of
in the case of
distribution
to a future time,
not do so in the case of a
to named
persons.
!d.-Estate or Interest Passing Under WUI-Vested and Contingent Gifts.-Where testatrix' will cn:ated a trust to pay her
niece the net income from
of the estate, a provision
that on the niece's death the trust should cease merely states
that the trust IS for her
and while the words thereafter
directing that the corpus shall "belong" to and "be delivered"
to the life tenant's
the remaindermen, may encompass ownership in other situations, they are not technical terms
hut ones common in everyday usage and may refer to possession only; such construction is reasonable, leaving the rule
of early vesting applicable.
[7] !d.-Estate or Interest Passing Under Will-Vested and Contingent Gifts.-The expression "belong to," as used in a will
directing that on a life tenant's death the trust property
"shall belong to and be delivered to" her children, adds nothing to the phrase "go to" such as in a devise to one for life
and the remainder to go to another; nor is there any persuasive significance to the remaindermen being referred to as
child or children, this merely indicating that testatrix wished
to keep the class open to any additional children of the life
tenant, who had only one child when the will was made and
when testatrix died.
[8] Id.-Estate or Interest Passing Under Will-Vested and Contingent Gifts.- Under testatrix' will creating a trust for the
benefit of her niece and on the niece's death the trust to cease
and "shall belong to and be delivered to" her child or children,
the quoted words did not give rise to a condition of survival
where to give them a contingent construction would be out of
harmony with the equal treatment of relatives which testatrix,
in other provisions of the will, appeared to have had in mind.
[9] Adoption-E:ffect.-It is the policy to accord to adopted children the same status as natural children. (Civ. Code, §§ 228,
229.)
[10] Id.-Inheritance.-An adopted child succeeds to the estate
of its adoptive parent in the same manner as a child born of
such parent.
[11] Id.-E:ffect.-The effect of an adoption is to establish between
the adopting parents and the child the legal relation of parent

---------------------------[10) See Oa!.Jur.2d, Adoption of Children, §§ 501 51; Am.Jur.,
Adoption of Children, § 59 et seq.
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and child, with all the legal consequences of that relation,
including the child's right to take the family name of the person adopting it.
[12] Wills--Designation of Takers--"Children."-The status of
an adopted child should be of some significance in construing
a will since the testator may be said to realize the possibility
of adoption and its effect; if the statute declares that the
adoptee shall be deemed a "child" of the adopting parents as
fully as though born to them in lawful wedlock, it is properly
one of the circumstances in the light of which a devise to the
"children" of the adopting parents should be read.
[13] !d.-Designation of Takers-"Children."-A letter written
by testatrix, seven years before execution of her will, from
which it may be inferred that when she made a bequest to
the "child or children" of her niece she intended to include
any children that the niece might adopt, may properly be
considered in construing the meaning of such words.
[14] Adoption-Collateral Attack.-An adoption order of a sister
state which has stood for many years may not be collaterally
attacked where the alleged irregularities are not of sufficient
importance.
[15] Id.-Validity.-Where an objector has not established that
an adoption order of a sister state was void, it must be presumed to have been valid.
[16] Wills--Construction-Law Governing.-The construction of
a will, with reference to property in this state, is governed
by California law. (Prob. Code, § 100.)

APPEALS from a judgment of the Superior Court of
Santa Clara County decreeing distribution of an estate and
settling the final account. M. G. Del Mutolo, Judge. Reversed
with directions.
James D. Adams, Albert J. Moorman, McCutcheon, Thomas,
Matthew, Griffiths & Greene, Dudley Robinson, Caryl Warner,
Warner & Sutton and Barbara Warner for Appellants.
John L. Bradley, Sam J. Whiting, Jr., Crimmins, Kent,
Draper & Bradley, Schwartz & Alschuler and Leon S.
Alschuler for Respondents.
CARTER, J.-These are appeals from a decree settling the
final account and distributing the property of the estate of
Jane Stanford who died testate in 1905.
By her will, dated July 28, 1903, decedent bequeathed
$2,000,000 in trust to the Union Trust Company (now Wells
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Fargo Bank) as trustee, as follows: ( 1) The net income of
one-half thereof to be paid her brother Ariel Lathrop during his life. The trust was to cease upon his death and the
corpus thereof was to belong to and be delivered to his named
relatives. (2) To pay to her niece, ,Jennie Lawton, the net
income from one-third of the other half for her lifetime
and "upon her death [the] trust shall cease" and one-third
of the corpus "shall belong and be delivered to the child or
children of" Jennie. (3) The same provision was made as
to her niece, Amy Hansen, as to one-third of the half. (4) The
net income from the remaining one-third was to be paid to
Daniel and Amy Gunning, children of decedent's deceased
niece, Christine Gunning. until they reached a certain age
when the corpus was to go to them, but if either died before
attaining the specified age. then to the children of the one
dying. Thereafter gifts were made to various persons. The
residue was bequeathed to Stanford University and provision was made for $100 to any contestant who attempted
to impair, invalidate or set aside the will and any amount
such contestant would have received, except for the contest,
was to go to Stanford University, the residuary legatee.
Probate proceedings were commenced and on April 6,
1906, a decree of partial distribution was rendered ordering
"that there be distributed to the respective legatees . . .
upon their respective legacies the following respective amounts,
namely: To the Union Trust Company [the trustee named
in the will] $1,900,000 in trust and upon the trusts provided
for by" her will "said trusts being expressed in said will
as follows." Then followed the exact wording of the will
above mentioned. On May 1, 1908, the court decreed the
settlement of the third and final account and ordered final
distribution. The decree recited that all legatees had been
paid their legacies in full, with the exception of Stanford
University, and ordered all the rest and remainder of the
estate known or unknown to be delivered to Stanford University.
Jennie Lawton ( (2) above) had one child, Daniel, who
died in 1926, before the death of his mother, bequeathing his
interest in the estate to his mother, Jennie. Shortly thereafter Jennie died and on October 7, 1927, the court decreed
that on Jennie's death the trust had ended and ordered that
the corpus of the trust be delivered to Jennie's executor,
stating that in its "opinion" the interest of Daniel "vested"
upon the death of the testatrix. Stanford University ap-

died in
Ruth Barton.

as her children,
in a New York court, Aimee Gunning Reynaud her two
Aimee
now
Minnie Rochester.
Hansen died in
her the persons she had
The court decreed that
corpus of the trust
be distributed to the
persons, Aimee Reynolds, Minnie
Rochester and Aimee
ihat the trust as to (1),
(2) and ( 4) had terminated and the remainder interests had
been distributed; that Ruth
the successor of Walter,
the son of Amy Hansen, should recf'ive nothing as Walter
had predeceased his mother. Rnth Barton and Stanford
University appeal.
Ruth Barton contends that the interest of Walter passed
to her although he predeceased his mother, Amy Hansen,
the life tenant of the property, be,,ause the remainder was
vested when the testatrix, Jane Stanford, died; that the
decrees in 1906 and 1908 distributing the property so construed the testatrix' will; that the 1927 decree with respect
to Jennie Lawton, which determined that the interest of
the remainderman, Daniel, passed to his legatee, Jennie,
although he died before the life tenant, Jennie, is res judicata
as to Stanford University.
Thus the main question presented is whether the remainder
to Walter was vested as to title in him at the death of the
testatrix with the right of possession postponed, or, stated
another way, whether \Valter's survival of the life tenant.
his mother, was a contingency upon which depended his or
his successor's interest as remaindermen.
[1] In construing the language of a bequrst, such as we
have here, the primary common law rule in favor of early
vesting of title in remaindermen and the preference for
vested rather than contingent remainders is firmly established
in this state. (Williams V. wauams, 73 Cal. 99 [14 P. 394];
Estate of Rider, 199 Cal. 742 [251 P. 805] ; In re Shoemake,
211 Cal. 457 [295 P. 830] ; Estate of Ritzman, 186 Cal. 567
[199 P. 783]; Estate of Riemer, 69 Cal.App.2d 634 [159 P.2d
677]; Estate of Norris, 78 Cal.App.2d 152 [177 P.2d 299];
Estate of Whitney, 176 Cal. 12 [169 P. 399]; Estate of Lawrence, 17 Cal.2d 1 [108 P.2d 893]; Victory Oil Co. v. Hancock
Oil Co., 125 Cal.App.2d 222 [270 P.2d 604] ; Rest., Property,
pr<Dce:ea:m~J:s
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§ 573.)
§ 243; Simes and
This rule is
in section
Probate
Code which
'"l'estamentary
devises and
to a person on
sumed to vest at the testator's death."
in
part: "A
a elass includes every
person
testator's death; but
when the
a future
it includes also all persons
within the
before
the time to which
is postponed." [2] And
it has been said
noted authors on t}Je subject, with the
citation of numerous
that: "A remainder limited
without words of condition to a class of persons, such as
'children,' one or more of whom is in existence and asceris vested, though subject to be divested in part by the
coming into existence or ascertainment of other members
of the class. This is the typical vested remainder subject to
open. Thus, if land is devised to A for life, remainder to
the children of A, the remainder vests in the children as
soon as they are in existence, although the other children
born to A will eventually participate in the enjoyment of
the estate. V sually this issue is involved when one of the
children of A has died before his ancestor, and the question
to be decided is whether the heirs of the deceased child take
a share in the remainder or whether it all passes to those
children who S?trvive A. If there were a condition precedent
of survival to the time of distribution, then the heirs of the
deceased child could not take. 'I'he conclusion that the remainder is vested, and not snbject to any condition precedent,
is regarded as being based upon the theory that there is a
person in being to whom the seisin conld pass. While the
interests of the unborn or unascertained persons can hardly
be spoken of as vested in any possible sense of the word, the
remainder is said to be vested, since the interest of the
ascertained person may be regarded as vested. This proposition can be stated in another way: the mere fact that the
entire membership of the class cannot be determined until
some later time when the interest becomes possessory does
not mean that there is a condition precedent that the existing
members of the class must survive until that time in order to
partake of present ownership. Only rarely does a court reach
a contrary result." (Emphasis added; Simes and Smith, The
Law of Future Interests (1956), § 146; see Rest., Property,
§§ 256, 257, 260.)
(3a] And: "
the cases indicate
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clearly that the mere fact that takers of a postponed gift
are described by a class designation such as children, grandchildren, nieces, nephews, and the like, does not give rise to
any implied condition of survival. In other words, a gift of
a future interest to a class may be vested in interest even
though possession and enjoyment are postponed. The whole
concept of a remainder vested subject to open is based upon
such a view, and the overwhelming weight of authority is
to the effect that gifts to a class, without any words of condition, are vested when there is some member of the class in
being." (Id., § 578.) [4] And further: "An examination of
the decisions indicates the following conclusions: First, if
a testator expressly provides that a class gift is to vest prior
to the time when the class closes, his intent will be effectuated.
[5] Second, as to devises of land, there is no presumption
that, in a gift to a class where distribution is postponed, there
is a condition precedent that the members of the class must
survive the period of distribution; as to bequests, at least in
some jurisdictions, courts may occasionally imply a condition precedent of survivorship in the case of a gift to a
class with distribution postponed to a future time where
they would not do so in the case of a gift to named persons.
"It is to be noted that the rules of construction which
separate the problem of vesting of class gifts and the problem
of the closing of classes are not mere technical doctrines
derived from lifeless concepts of property law. The court,
in a very real way, is effectuating what the normal testator
would desire. Consider the typical case where a testator
leaves his residuary estate to his son A for life, remainder
to A's children. Suppose A has two children at the testator's
death. One of them dies before A, and two more children
are born. In many instances the testator has not contemplated
these changes in circumstances. Yet, had he done so, he
probably would have wished to include in the class all those
children living at his own death plus all those subsequently
born. If we regard the time of vesting of the class and the
time of its closing as one and the same, this wish cannot be
effectuated. The children, as of the testator's death, are but
two. The children, as of the time of A's death, are three.
But, if we apply the rule that the remainder vests in the two
living at the testator's death, subject to open and let in
after-born children, we let in all four children. All stirpes
are represented." (Id., § 654.) In In re Shoemake, 211 Cal.
457, 460 [295 P. 830], the court was considering whether the
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successors of the life tenant's daughter, who died before the
life tenant, would take where, under a deed, the remainder was
to the heirs of the life tenant, the court saying in the course
of discussion: "At that time Lela Barnett [the daughter]
was living and could have been specially mentioned ; she was
not. She might have been clearly identified as the holder of
a vested remainder by the use of the term 'children' without
other language, but was not. What could the grantor have
had in mind 1 Certainly not the intention to provide for
Lela Barnett in particular, but in general for his descendents,
including Lela Barnett. The intention to have his property
go to persons in his own line of descent seems plain. If, however, a vested remainder came to Lela Barnett, it was possible for her P'tior to her actual possession of the property
[emphasis that of the court] to alien her future interests,
so that it might go to strangers." (Emphasis added.) In
Estate of Backesto, 71 Cal.App. 409 [235 P. 670] the testator's
will bequeathed a life estate to his wife and "after her death,
the property shall be sold, and the proceeds shall be equally
divided" between "the children" of certain brothers aud
sisters of the testator and his wife. A child of one of the
brothers died before the wife who was the life tenant. The
court held that the successor of the child dying before the life
tenant took the child's share, stating at page 416: "All
these sections [various sections of the Civil Code•] show the
unmistakable intention of the statutory law to declare that
a devise or bequest shall vest at the testator's death unless
some other intention is expressed in the will. This policy
has been recognized and approved by the California decisions.
(Williams v. Williams, 73 Cal. 99, 102 [14 P. 394]; In re De
Vries, 17 Cal.App. 184, 190 [119 P. 109] ; MiUer v. Oliver,
54 Cal.App. 495, 498 [202 P. 168] ; Estate of Campbell, 149
Cal. 712, 717 [87 P. 573].) The same rule is approved in 23
R.C.L., pp. 530, 535, Doe etc. v. Considine, 6 Wall. (73 U.S.)
458, 475 [18 L.Ed. 469, see also Rose's U.S. Notes], and
McArthur v. Scott, 113 U.S. 340, 378 [28 L.Ed. 1015, 5 S.Ct.
652] ; 24 Am. & Eng. Ency. of Law, 2d ed., p. 382; and numerous other authorities which we deem it unnecessary to
cite. It is accepted as a settled principle by such text-writers
as 2 Jarman on Wills, p. 841; 2 Williams on Executors, 7th
ed., p. 1344, Alexander on Wills, § 996, Minor on Real
Property, § 749, and Tiedeman on Real Property, § 302.
• Including tile text now in Probate Code, section 123, ftflnl.

of
to
the description at
that the estate vests in them as they
come in esse
the
is postponed to a future
" In
v.
154 Cal. 186
P. 300], the
decree of distribution
that on the termination of a
trust, the duration of which was measured
the
of the
the corpus was "to go" to the testator's
widow. The court held that the widow possessed an interest,
which was not
upon her survivorship until the
termination of the trust, and
having died before that
time, nevertheless had an interest
the life of the trust
which passed to her heirs or devisees. In Estate of Wallace,
11 Cal.2d 338 [79 P.2d 1094], the decree of distribution
distributed the property in trust with directions to pay the
testator's widow a specified periodic sum out of the income,
and also directed that two named children receive the balance
of the income, and upon the death of the life tenant-widow
the trust was to terminate and the trustee "shall distribute
the balance'' of the trust property to the two children. One
of the children predeceased the widow but the court held that
her share passed to her heirs as a vested remainder, reasoning
that the words "shall distribute" (the direction to the trustee)
referred to the distribution or delivery of the possession of
the property rather than creating a contingency of survivorship or the passage of title. In Estate of Norris, 78 Cal.App.
2d 152 [177 P .2d 299], the will set up a trust and provided
that the trust should end on the death of named persons
and "thereupon and at once the ... trustee shall grant and
deliver" the corpus to the "children" of Frederic and Edith,
the testator's son and wife. One of the children died before
the life tenants. The decree of distribution was somewhat
differently phrased. The court held that the deceased son's
heirs or devisees took his interest, stating at page 161: ''The
law is well settled that vested remainders can be created in a
class the membership of which is not complete at the effective
date of the grant or devise, so that similar vested interests
accrue to those who, by later entry therein, fall within the
class. Thus, in the present case, even if the 'after-born'
clause referred to the remainders as well as to the trust (the
trial court found it referred only to the trust), that factor
would not indicate that the remainders were contingent. In
such a case the remainders could well be vested in the three
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children of Frederic and
had there been any later
entrants into the class
were not), their interests would
have vested as
and by virtue of the conseincrease in the class membership, the vested interests
of the preceding members would have been proportionately
diminished. It is well settled that the fact that the interests
members of the class may be thus diminished does
not convert the interest of such. members to contingent remainders. In such event the remainders are vested subject
to a condition subsequent. This is the rule of the Restatement. In 2 Restatement of the Law of Property, section 157,
it is provided that: 'A remainder can be (a) indefeasibly
vested; or (b) vested subject to open.... ' As an illustration
of clause (b) the Restatement states: 'A, owning Blackacre
in fee simple absolute, transfers Blackacre "to B for life,
remainder to the children of B." B has a child C. C has a
remainder vested subject to open and let in other children
born to B.' " (See also to the same import, Estate of Welch,
83 Cal.App.2d 391 [188 P.2d 797]; Estate of Newman, 68
Cal.A.pp. 420 [229 P. 898] ; Estate of Klein, 23 Cal.App.2d
708 [74 P.2d 79]; Estate of Riemer, 69 Cal.App.2d 634 [159
P.2d 677].) [3b] Estate of Cavarly, 119 Cal. 406 [51 P.
629], apparently is to the contrary on its assumption that a
gift of a future interest to a class was dependent on survival
but it misconstrued the authority cited therefor (see 40 Cal.
L.Rev. 58-59) and failed to apply a portion of the provisions
of section 1337 of the Civil Code, now section 123 of the
Probate Code, S1tpra. The same is true of Estate of Clark,
64 Cal.App.2d 636 [149 P.2d 465]. Those cases ( Cavarly
and Clark) and such cases as Estate of Blake, 157 Cal. 448
[108 P. 287], and Estate of Hamon, 136 Cal.App. 517 [29
P.2d 326], are disapproved insofar as the question herein
decided is concerned. Anglo California Nat. Bank v. Kidd,
58 Cal.App.2d 651 [137 P.2d 460), and In re Rogers, 94 Cal.
526 [29 P. 962], may be distinguished on the basis of the
language in the instrument construed. Estate of Hartson,
218 Cal. 536 [24 P.2d 171], and In re Winter, 114 Cal. 186
[ 45 P. 1063], did not apply the erroneous rule of Estate of
Cavarly, snpra, 119 Cal. 406, that in case of class gifts there
is a condition of survivorship and may also be distinguished
on the basis of the language used in the instruments construed.
[6] The words of the will directing that on Mrs. Hansen's
death the trust should cease is nothing more than a way of
4& C.2d--41
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saying that the trust is for her life. While the words thereafter directing that the corpus shall "belong" to and "be
delivered'' to the' life tenant's children, the remaindermen,
may encompass ownership in other situations (see, for
example, Hackett v. Cahfornia Laundry, 7 Cal.App.2d Supp.
757 [45 P.2d 833]; San Francisco v. McGovern, 28 Cal.App.
491 [152 P. 980]: State Land Settlement Board v. Henderson,
197 Cal. 470 [241 P. 560]; 10 C.J.S. 241), they are not technical terms but are ones which are common in everyday usage
and may refer to possession only. Certainly that construction is reasonable, leaving the rule of early vesting applicable.
This serves to distinguish Estate of Easter, 24 Cal.2d 191
[148 P.2d 601]. In that case, the term to be construed was
the technical word ''vest,'' and the clause in which it was
contained did not appear in the will but had been added by
the probate court in its distribution decree. It was, therefore,
concluded that the word ''vest'' did not give rise to the application of the early vesting rule, but referred to ownership.
The situations in the present case and in the Easter case are
thus different. The direction for delivery is an instruction
to the trustee of the trust. [7] 'l'he expression ''belong to''
adds nothing to the phrase ''go to'' such as in a devise to
A for life and the remainder to go to B. Nor do we attach
any persuasive significance to the remaindermen being referred to as child or children. It merely indicates that the
testator wished to keep the class open to any additional children of Amy Hansen inasmuch as she had only one child when
the will was made and when the testatrix died.
Declaring the intent of the testatrix as the court must, the
foregoing construction finds support in the will as a whole.
The significance of the will's provisions can be appreciated
in the light of the situation then existing with respect to the
family of the testatrix, i.e., the Lathrop family. The testatrix
had six brothers but no sisters, and, at the time of her death,
only two of her brothers were alive, Charles, who had children,
and Ariel, who did not. Of the four deceased brothers, only
one, Daniel, had left issue. His children were Jennie Lawton,
who, on the effective date of the will, had one child, Daniel;
Amy Hansen, who had one child, Walter; and Christine
Gunning, who had died leaving two children, Daniel and Amy
Gunning.
The will disposed of a substantial sum for the benefit of
the members of the I1athrop family. One million was left to
Charles as an outright gift. The other two million were
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placed in trust. Ariel was to receive income from one million
dollars for life, and it was provided that upon his death, "as
he had no children or descendants,'' the trust as to that
portion "shall cease and determine" and that the portion
"shall belong to and be delivered to" Charles and the descendants of Daniel, Charles to receive one-half, Jennie Lawton
one-third of the other half, Amy Hansen another third of the
second half and Daniel and Amy Gunning the final third of
that half. As to the second million which was placed in trust.
income from one-third was to be paid to Jennie Lawton for
life, and it was provided that upon her death the trust as
to that portion "shall cease and determine" and that tht>
portion "shall belong to and be delivered to" her child or
children. An identical provision, which is the one involved
in the present case, was made with respect to another third
of the second million in favor of Amy Hansen and her child
or children. The final third of that million was left in trust
to pay the income to Daniel and Amy Gunning until the
younger reached the age of 25, at which time the trust involving this fund ''shall cease and determine'' and tht> fund
''shall belong to and be dt>livered '' to them in equal shares;
provided, however, that if either child should die prior to
the date of distribution then his share to his children or if
no children to the other, or if the survivor of the two children
also dies prior to the date of distribution then to his or her
children or "heirs at law."
Following the above dispositions, the will left various bequests to the testatrix' secretary, servants and certain
charities. In a subsequent paragraph the testatrix explained
that "Since executing former wills, a Kind Providence has
brought about more favorable conditions in the affairs of the
Estate left me by my beloved husband, and for this reason
I have greatly enlarged my gifts to the Leland Stanford
,Junior University, and I now feel ,justified in enlarging, as
I have done in this Will, my bequests to my relatives and
friends and different charities, which have been ever dear to
my heart." She then gave certain itt>ms of personal property
and the residue of her estate to Stanford University.
It seems reasonable to conclude that, as is sugge>sted by the
testatrix' explanatory statement quoted above, her dominant
purpose "now," that is, in making the will, was to enlarge
gifts to the members of the r~athrop family. The manner in
which the assets were disposed of reflects some intent to
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benefit the
on a per
the then existing facts with
ence of issue. This
of course, first indicated by the
allotment of one million dollars for the benefit of each of the
testatrix' two
as well as for the descendants of the
deceased brother who had left issue. The
plan may appear from the
to the
descendants of
where the per
pressly
tion may be found in the provision disposing of the remainder
after Ariel's life
where the will, after explaining that
Ariel had no children or descendants, divides the remainder
equally between, on the one hand, Charles, who had children,
and, on the other hand, the descendants of Daniel. The matter which might, at first glance, seem somewhat inconsistent
with the suggested pattern is that the gifts benefiting Charles'
branch of the family were made directly to him instead of his
descendants, but this fact is explained. Unlike Daniel,
Charles was alive, and, unlike Ariel, Charles had issue. The
evidence shows that t.he testatrix had complete trust in
Charles, and we would seem justified in assuming that she
was confident that the gifts left to him would ultimately
benefit his descendants on a per stirpes basis.
Taken in the light of the foregoing, certain aspects of the
will have significance in connection with the question whether
a condition of survival was intended in the provision before us.
[8] In the first place, it seems that the testatrix would
not have intended that the descendants of brother Daniel
should get more benefit from her property than the descendants of Charles, or vice versa. Yet, such unequal treatment
was entirely possible, so far as the testatrix knew, if the
words "shall belong to and be delivered to" gave rise to a
condition of survival. As we have seen, those words were
used in every instance in which there was a remainder after
an income trust, including the remainder following Ariel's
life interest, where the corpus was to go in halves to Charles
and to the named descendants of Daniel. 'rhus, if the language in question made the dispositions contingent, and if
Charles predeceased Ariel, the most which Charles' descendants might expect would be the benefit of the one million
dollars given outright to
whereas the descendants
of Daniel, were they to survive Ariel, would realize the benefit
not only of the million provided for them initially, but also
of their one-half million share of the remainder following
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Ariel's interest.
construction.
if the named descendants
or any of them, prethe share of the remainder going to thai
would totally or partially fall into the
even though
left issue, whereas, should Charles
:survive
his descendants
benefit from a million
and a half dollars of the testatrix' money.
In the second place, it appears that the testatrix would not
have wished to treat unequally descendants of Daniels having
the same
to him. Yet, if she were held to have
intended a condition of survival with respect to the re.
mainders following the life interests of Jennie Lawton and
Amy Hansen, such a situation could easily have arisen. For
example, so far as the testatrix knew, all children of Jennie
might die before her but leave children of their own, who
would be entitled to nothing under the contingent construction, whereas, if Amy's children should survive her, their
chile'- .~n might expect to benefit. Thus, great-grandchildren
of Daniel would receive unequal treatment. In this connection, it should be noted that Daniel's great-grandchildren
through Christine were expressly contemplated as possible
beneficiaries under the provisions that, should Daniel or Amy
Gunning die before reaching the age of 25, the deceased's
share of corpus was to go to his or her children, if any. It
should not therefore be supposed that the testatrix would
have intended that Daniel's great-grandchildren through
Jennie Lawton and Amy Hansen would not benefit if their
parents failed to survive the intervening trusts.
Another respect in which the will, as a whole, seems opposed
to a contingent construction is the indication from the language used therein that the property made available to the
Lathrops should in no event fall into the residue. There
would appear to be no question in this connection, so far as
the outright gift to Charles is concerned. The same is true
as to the gift to the Gunnings, since it was expressly provided
that, should they die without issue before reaching the age
of 25, their interest was to go "to the heirs at law" of the
survivor. It is diffieult to see why the testatrix would have
intended that Stanford be in a different position with respect
to property disposed of by the other provisions.
Finally, with reference specifically to the provision under
consideration, it should be noted that, so far as the testatrix
knew, it was possible that Walter would be the only child
Amy Hansen would ever have and that Walter would pre-
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decease his mother, leaving children of his own. In such an
event, if the testatrix made the remainder following Amy's
life interest contingent on survival of Amy, Walter's children
could not benefit from it, either through intestate succession
or under a will which Walter might make in their favor, and
the remainder would go to Stanford under the residuary
clause. It is doubtful that the testatrix would have intended
to use language making such a development possible, particularly when, as we have seen, she expressly provided in the
clause invnlving the Gunnings that, if either of them failed
to survive the intervening trust, his children should take and
that, if both of them died without issue before the end of the
trust, their gift was not to go to Stanford but to the heirs at
law of the survivor. Ruth Barton is, of course, in the same
position as children of Walter would have been, had they been
the claimants here.
In short, the testatrix' intent in framing the will must be
determined in the light of the eventualities which, so far as
she was in a position to know, were possible, rather than in
the light of what actually developed after her death, and, so
viewed, a contingent construction of the words ''shall belong
to and be delivered to" would seem to be out of harmony
with the equal treatment of relatives which she appears to
have had in mind.
Since we have concluded that the lower court was in error
in deciding that Ruth Barton did not take a portion of the
remainder as successor of Walter Hansen, the son of Amy
Hansen, who was alive when the testatrix died but predeceased
his mother, it is not, therefore, necessary to discuss the contention of Ruth Barton with regard to the effect of the 1906
and 1927 decrees of partial distribution.
Stanford University contends, contrary to the finding by
the lower court, that the remaindermen of the devise to
Amy Hansen could not include the persons adopted by her
as her children. It will be recalled that Amy Hansen had
the court approval of an adoption agreement entered in New
York in 1924, after the death of the testatrix, by which she
adopted her niece, Mrs. Reynolds, an adult, and the two
minor children of Mrs. Reynolds, Aimee and Minnie Rochester.
The adoption approval provided that the adoption "be allowed
and confirmed and henceforth the said Aimee G. Reynolds,
Aimee Christine Rochester and Minnie Devereaux Bond
Rochester shall be regarded and treated in all respects as the
children of said Aimee Lathrop Hansen."
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It is clear from the authorities heretofore discussed that
the class, children, was to remain open to additional children
after the death of the testatrix, and it should be equally clear
that children adopted after the death of the testatrix are
included as remaindermen.
(9] It has been the policy of this state, at least since the
adoption of the Civil Code, to accord to adopted children the
same status as natural children. "A child, when adopted,
may take the family name of the person adopting. After
adoption, the two shall sustain towards each other the legal
relation of parent and child, and have all the rights and be
subject to all the duties of that relation." ( Civ. Code, § 228.)
"The parents of an adopted child are, from the time of the
adoption, relieved of all parental duties towards, and all
responsibility for, the child so adopted, and have no right
over it." ( Civ. Code, § 229.) " 'If the adopted child is
by virtue of its status to be ''regarded and treated in all
respects as the child of the person adopting," and is to "have
all the rights and be subject to all the duties of the legal
relation of parent and child," the right to succeed to the
estate of the deceased parent must be included.' (In re
Newman, supra, 75 Cal. 213, 219 [16 P. 887, 7 Am.St.Rep.
146].)" (Estate of Pierce, 32 Cal.2d 265, 268 [196 P.2d 1].)
[10] This court has squarely held that ". . . an adopted
child has a status with respect to its adoptive parent identical
to that of a child born of such parent and succeeds to the
estate of an adoptive parent in the same manner as a child
born of such parent . . . . " (Estate of Pierce, supra, 32 Cal.2d
265, 268.) [11] "The effect of an adoption is to establish
between the adopting parents and the child the legal relation
of parent and child, with all the legal consequences of that
relation, including the child's right to take the family name
of the person adopting it. This necessarily implies that the
natural relationship between the child and its parents by
blood is superseded. The adopting parent is substituted for
the parent by blood, who ceases to be in a legal sense the
parent, his place being taken by the adopting parent. In
other words, from the time of the adoption, the parents b:v
blood are relieved of all parental dutirs towards, and all
responsibility for, the child adopted, and have no right over it.
"The effect of the adoption is not limited to the period of
the lives of the adopting parent and the adopted child; and
the relation of parent and child, which existed between the
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parent
blood and
revived
the death of the
of the child.
''Adoption does not affect
child; and a minor does not
his adoption by an alien.''
§ 46.
The Probate
than at the testatrix'
ceeds to the estate of one who has
the same as
a natural child; and the person
succeeds to the
estate of an
the same as a natural
An
adopted child does not succeed to the estate of a natural parent
when the relationship between them has been severed by the
adoption, nor does such natural parent succeed to the estate of
such adopted child." (Prob. Code, § 257.) The foregoing
policy of our law is a factor in determining whether the term
"children" includes an adopted person. It has been said that
generally the term ''children'' might not include adopted
children (Rest., Property, § 287; Simes and Smith, The Law
of Future Interests (2d ed.), § 724; 144 A.L.R. 670; 70 id.
621) but also: "Similarly, the existence of a statute which
simultaneously includes the adopted child as an intestate taker
from his adopting parents and excludes him as an intestate
taker from his natural parents (see § 288, Comment b) facilitates a finding that the conveyor used the word 'child' with
the intent to include thereby such an adopted person, as a
child of his adopting parent, even though the requirements
of neither Clause (a) nor Clause (b) are satisfied. When
such facts concur with other constructional factors having
the same constructional urge, the inclusion of the adopted
child is justified." (Rest., Property, § 287, com. d.) And
it has been held that ''children'' when used in statutes includes an adopted child. (Estate of Mercer, 205 Cal. 506
[271 P. 1067] ; Estate of Moore, 7 Cal.App.2d 722 [47 P.2d
533, 48 P.2d 28].) In the .Mercer case it was said (p. 510):
''The weakness of appellant's position is simply that the
adopted daughter cannot have the full benefit of her right as
a daughter of the deceased husband iu her relation to said
husband unless the word 'children' in this statute of succession is held to include her. The predeceased spouse had an
interest in, if not full ownership of, the property in question.
Natural justice suggests that his daughter have an interest
therein. In making his will he may have had the very contingency in mind that has arisen, and decedent, too, may,

''As another
suppose decedent had willed the
to 'my heirs' or to the 'children of my deceased
HU>~U,~H''-',) would there be any
but that such a testament would include the
?
' included an
146,
P. 10];
In re Darling, supra
Cal. 221 (159 P. 606)]). Appellant
admits that the word 'issue' in several
in said section
child.
an
ehild has
does include an
been held to be a lineal descendant of the adopting parent
of Winchester, supra: W m·ren v. Prescott, 84 Me.
483 [30 Am.St.Rep. 370, 17 I1.R.A.
24 A. 948}). If this
be conceded, it argu.es
the nile that an adopted
child is entitltd to any legacy the law gives to the children
an adopting parent.
"The whole matter is concluded
the observation that the
cases cited and the principles urged
appellant furnish no
sufficient reason for restricting the scope of the word 'children'
in the provision under review. To exclude adopted children
from its scope would be to say that
are not entitled as
to the adopting parent to the full rights of natural children,
which is contrary to the express provision of the statute ( § §
227 and 228, Civ. Code), and the terms of the decree of adoption. Even the case of
v.
200 Mo. 456 [118
Am.St.Rep. 672, 9 Ann.Cas. 775, 8 r,.R.A.N.S. 117, 98 S.W.
585], above referred to, concedes that 'the adopted child is
so let in only for the purpose of
in full its right
of inheritance from its
parent.'" (Emphasis added.)
It is said in Dyer v. Lane, 202 . rk. 571 [151 S.W.2d 678, 680] :
"We think a proper construction of this will means, that the
testator, when he speaks of 'the heirs of my son, Haskell A.
Dyer', meant the children r TTaskrll A. Dyer. Children may
include adopted children as ,1ell as the children of one's body.
Deener v. Watkins, 191 Ark. 776
S.W.2d 994J. In Powell
v. Hayes, 176 Ark 660 [3 S.W.2d
975), this court said:
" 'In the alleged will under consideration in this case the
testator gave the balance of his
to his wife and heirs.
as the law provides. In its strict legal sense the word "heirs"
signifies "those upon ·whom the law casts the inheritance of
real estate." But this construction will give way if there
c
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be upon the face of the instrument sufficient to show that
it was to be applied to children. Flint Wisconsin Trust Co.,
151 Wis. 231 [138 N.W.
Ann. Cas. 1914B, page 67], and
case note at page 70; 2
on Wills by Alexander,
pars. 850-852, inclusive; 1 Page on Wills (2d Ed.) p. 1496,
§ 891; and 28 R.C.L. p. 248, § 216 .... " (See, also, Kelly v.
Kelly, 176 Ark. 548 [3 S.W.2d 305] Deener v. Watkins, 191
Ark. 776 [87 S.W.2d
.) In Estate of Pierce, 32 Cal.2d
265, 268 [196 P.2d 1], it was held there was a showing that the
testator did not intend to include adopted children by the
use of the term lawful issue and that the adoption statutes
do not require, in the face of other evidence, that such words
include an adopted person. [12] The status of an adopted
child should be of some significance in construing a will for
the testator may be said to realize the possibility of adoption
and its effect. It has been well said: " . . . by investing an
adoptee with a particular status, such as that of a 'child' of
the adopter, the statute may have the inclusionary effect of
tending to bring the adoptee within a designation. Thus,
if the statute declares that the adoptee shall be deemed a
'child' of the adopting parents as fully as though born to them
in lawful wedlock, it is properly one of the circumstances in
the light of which a devise to the 'children' of the adopting
parents should be read. Where it is the sole surrounding
circumstance of any materiality, the argument may be advanced that it supplies the conveyor's meaning. . . .
"[I]t is interesting to discover that even sixty years ago
the Supreme Court of Alabama had no difficulty in concluding
that, absent language in the adopting statute confining the
adoptee's rights to those of inheritance, it would have been
the probable 'duty' of the court to hoU that an adopted
child took under the term 'children' in a will, for the reason
that by dictionary definition adoption is 'an act by which
a person appoints as his heir the child of another,' and meam
'to receive and to treat as a son or daughter one who is the
child of another,' and 'to take into one's family as son and
heir; to take and treat as a child, giving a title to the privileges
and rights of a child.' To this thought, then expressed, can
be added now the further one that by a century of development in states with a background of common law the institution of adoption, though not indigenous to us, has becomP
'naturalized' here and is an important and familiar adjunct
of our society and our law. It cannot be dismissed as involving the unusual. •••
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"Other
in growing number,
do not restrict the status
the adoptee to that of an heir
of the adopter or to that of a child for purposes of enumerated
benefits only. The trend is toward making the adopted child
a child of the
to all intents and purposes. Thus,
in
including a few alprovisions with
to the actual effect of the adoption, the portion of
the adoption statute relative to the making of the decree
provides for a declaration therein that the adoptee shall be
the child of the adopter 'to all
intents and purposes,' or
that he shall be regarded and treated 'in all respects' as the
child of the adopter, or that the rights, duties, privileges and
relations between the adoptee and adopters shall 'in all respects' be those of a child born in lawful wedlock ....
"Unrestricted by such an amendment, the wide language
of the original Massachusetts statute and others like it can
reasonably be taken to supply a prima facie meaning for
'child,' when used in a private instrument, which woald
include an adoptee. This is indicated by Sewall v. Roberts.
supra [115 Mass. 262], and it is the conclusion reached or
suggested in some other cases, both where the conveyor himself was the adopter and where he was not. . . .
''For the purposes of the discussion it was more or less
tacitly assumed that the adoption statute constituted one
of the circumstances surrounding the formulation of the
language of the instrument, and was to be considered as such.
This was in harmony with the announced attitude of most
courts which have taken the trouble of referring to the point
at all. Otherwise stated, it is presumed that the instrument
was executed in the light of knowledge of the then existing
adoption law. A few courts only would disregard the adoption statute entirely or openly belittle its position among
the surrounding circumstances. Thrre is more common and
proper reluctance to attach to the statute, in its relation to
the construction of a private instrument, a presumptively
controlling significance in the face of other circumstances
which may be felt to be of importance al~m . . . .
"No one can read the cases on this subject without soon
becoming aware of what for the most part is an unexpressed
but nonetheless perceptible attitude of fear on the part of
the courts that, unless they
we11 against
thr institution of adoption may be an implement of self-advancement,

140

[49 C.2d
such as a
has been some
of a few of the cases.

through au adoption.
was to receive a third of the
income from a trust for life or until he should have a child
that should attain the age of three years, and in the latter event
he was to receive a third of the principal, the court held that,
having no natural
he did not qualify for the corpus
share, although he and his wife took a child of about six
months into their household approximately a year after the
testator died, and
the child three years later. And
there is authority that one given a fee simple estate, defeasible in event of his death without children or issue, could
not by subsequent adoption acquire an absolute estate and
avoid the executory limitation. . . .
"If, as is the usual case, the adopter has a life estate only,
but his children, issue or other relatives are to take the remainder, with gift over to others if he die without children.
etc., then the chances of direct personal gain to the adopter
are not great, eveu if adopted children should qualify as
takers within the
of the will. In this situation,
however, courts seem moved by a fear that if they should
recognize adoptees as qualifying under the will to take the
remainder, the life tenant
adopt a child simply to
defeat the gift over to others ....
"The possibility of the use of adoption for avaricious or
spiteful purposes cannot be denied. The probability of its
employment for those ends is
however, to be slight
under modern
statutes contemplating a thorough investigation into such matters as the motives of the prospective
It should be time
to speculate upon possible
when the fraud is found. And
in
the public interest, a court
ought not overlook any which may be manifested by the
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a letter written
of
of
testatrix'
The letter shows that Charles'
was an infant and before
to take care of the child. Mr. Stanford
to
taking the child in as their own but Jennie was cared for by
the testatrix. The testatrix said she
the letter on record
with Stanford
because ''So very many unexpected
and new phases in human nature have been brought to my
attention, and in a way have added to my sorrows-some
hearts have hardened towards me who should have been
sympathetic aud tender because of my dear husband's loving
remembrance of them and these revelations of character have
me to write this
led me into a train of thought that
letter to you that you may fully understand the relations that
exist between my niece Jennie L.
and myself. '' And
in closing, "I make this explicit explanation in this letter to
you that you may hold it sacred and if ... the subject would
be discussed whether or not Jennie L. Lathrop had been
adopted, you can use this letter
defend me.
"I hope and pray that there will be no need to ever produce
it, but I have learned by very sad experience the greed for
gain tempts beyond the ability to resist. My dear brother
Charles G. Lathrop the Father has been most kind in allowing me to care and do for her as best pleased me, and he will
never deviate from his love and loyalty to me, or my memory."
The letter also states that Jennie and all the children of
Mrs. Stanford's brothers, then living, had been given one
hundred thousand dollars in her husband's will. She expresses the opinion that she has won the love and devotion
of this niece. From this letter the trial court concluded that
Mrs. Stanford understood the meaning and effect of adoption,
that she believed that an adopted child would have the same
rights as a natural child, hence when she made a bequest to
the "child or children" of her niece, Mrs. Hansen, she intended to include any children that Mrs. Hansen might adopt.
While the letter is not conelusive evidence, it, together with
the foregoing public policy with reference to adoption and
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that the testatrix had
the status of the person
and its effect upon the
considered the matter
person adopted.
[14] There is no merit to Stanford University's claim
that the New York
was not an adoption. Mrs.
Hansen and Mrs.
and her children appeared before the New York court
to the adoption and the
court approved it. ·while there may have been some irregularities in the proceeding
are not of sufficient importance
upon which to base a collateral attack. While the divorced
husband of Mrs. Reynolds and the father of the children may
not have been notified (the proceedings do not show whether
or not he was) and did not consent, we fail to see how that
will avail Stanford University here. The adoption has stood
for many years, since 1924, without attack by anyone.
(See, Estate of Smith, 86 Cal.App.2d 456 [195 P.2d 842].)
[15] Stanford University has not established that the adoption was void and it must be presumed to have been valid.
(Estate of Smith, supra, 86 Cal.App.2d 456.) The effect of
adoption under the New York law and construction of the will
is not important. We are not here concerned with a question
of inheritance but with the construction of a will, and whether
''child or children'' includes adopted persons. [16] The construction of the will is governed by California law (see Prob.
Code, § 100; Rest., Conflicts, § 308). Stanford University
suggests that the adoption was not made in good faith but
merely for the purpose of inheritance-to bring the adopted
persons under the will to the exclusion of Stanford University,
the residuary legatee. This the lower court felt was not
established and it is doubtful if it would be significant if it
had been unless it showed the invalidity of the adoption which
it does not. We find nothing in the will or the surrounding
circumstances favoring Stanford University over the interpretation we have given the will.
The decree is reversed with directions to the trial court to
order distribution of the property in accordance with the
views herein expressed.
Gibson, C. J., Traynor, J., and Schauer, J., concurred.
ASHBURN, J. protem.,* Dissenting.-Unable to concur in
the prevailing opinion, I feel impelled to express my views
upon the proper approach to this case and its ultimate disposition.
*Assigned by Chairman of J udicia.l Council
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..-n,• • ..-rm-.. years after the execution of the last testament of
Jane Lathrop Stanford it becomes the province of this court
to construe one
of that will, which creates a trust for
the benefit of testatrix'
L.
during her
lifetime, with remainder to ''the child or children of said Amy
L. Hansen." The
rise to this litigation is
phrased as follows: 'c. To pay over at regular intervals to
my niece, the said
IL
the full one-third of the
net income
from said one million dollars, being onehalf of said trust fund, for and
the term of her natural
life, and upon her death this trust shall cease and determine
as to one-third of said one million dollars and the said onethird of said one million dollars shall belong to and be delivered to the child or children of said Amy L. Hansen."
The will is dated July 28, 1903; Mrs. Stanford died on
February 28, 1905. Her niece, Amy L. Hansen, was 37 years
of age when the will was made; she had one son, Walter L.
Hansen, who was then 13 years old; he died on October 21,
1918, without issue, at the age of 28, leaving all his estate
by will to Mrs. Ruth Barton, who was not a relative of Mrs.
Stanford but a total stranger to her. His mother, Amy L.
Hansen, survived him. Some 19 years after the death of
Mrs. Stanford, on February 23, 1924, Mrs. Hansen adopted
under the laws of New York her own niece, Aimee G. Reynolds,
an adult, and Aimee's two minor children now named Minnie
Devereaux Bond Rochester and Aimee Christine Muniz. These
children had not been born at the time of Mrs. Stanford's
death and she had had no information about any such prospective adoption and no reason to anticipate it as a probable
future event.
Mrs. Hansen having died without issue of her body then surviving, the trust terminated on August 4, 1954. Mrs. Barton,
as legatee and distributee of the entire estate of Walter L.
Hansen, claimed the Stanford trust estate upon the theory
that it vested in Walter upon the death of Mrs. Stanford and
passed to claimant through his will; also that the word
"children" in the quoted paragraph of Mrs. Stanford's will
did not include any adopted children of Mrs. Hansen. Those
adoptees assert ownership of the trust remainder upon the
theory that Walter's interest was contingent upon his surviving his mother and ceased upon his death prior to her demise;
that the word "ch:Jdren" included those adopted by Mrs.
Hansen and hence they were entitled to the remainder. As
residuary legatee named in the will, The Board of Trustees
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to the trust
and
tion of the trust
the will does not
L. Hansen.
The

to terminaas used in
Amy
Bank

the persons
the trust estate. The trial court,
the claims of the adoptees
and ordered distribution of the trust estate
in equal shares to
Aimee G. Reynolds, Minnie
Devereaux Bond Rochester and Aimee Christine Muniz. The
University and Mrs. Barton
separately, each asserting title to the trust estate to the exclusion of all other
claimants.
All authorities agree that the paramount desideratum in
the construction of a will is the ascertainment of the testator's
intention as
therein through words or fair implication. "It is generally
that a testamentary instrument is to be examined with a view to discovering the decedent's testamentary schc·me or general intention, and that
the apparent meaning of particular words, phrases and provisions is to be subordinated to this scheme, plan or dominant
purpose. The technical
of words should not prevail
over the obvious intent of the testator." (Estate of Puett,
I Cal.2d 131, 133
P.2d
.)
It is contended
appellant Barton that there was error
in receiving parol evidence over objection because the will is
unambiguous upon its face. It is a mistaken notion that a
·will can be interpreted without reference to the property or
the persons upon which it
or the circumstances in
which it was made.
Paley v. Superior Court, 137 CaL
App.2d 450, 455-456 [290 P.2d
.) When the language of
the document before us is
to its factual setting, an
ambiguity arises.
the most recent definition of ambiguity
in Beneficial etc. Ins. Co.
Knrt Hitke d1 Oo., 46 Cal.2d 517,
524-525 [297 P.2d
.) Such an uncertainty, whether
deemed latent or
removable by resort to extrinsic
evidence. (Paley v.
sttpra, at page 457; Estate
of Sargwva.k. 41 CaL2d
319 [259 P.2d 897] ; Estate of
Pierce, 32 Cal.2d
273-274 [196 P.2d 1].) When the
1
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words "child or children" are applied to the facts at bar a
substantial ambiguity arises, first, as to whether a child who
was living at testatrix' death must survive the life tenant in
order to take full title or on the other hand immediately acquires an equitable fee which he may pass by assignment or
u,o,vvO>.LLJlu.u; secondly, whether those words emthe life tenant many years after
testatrix' death. There was no error in receiving the extrinsic evidence at bar. True, it did not go to testatrix' intent concerning the legal concept of vesting (the point made
by Mrs. Barton's counsel), but it did reflect direct light upon
her intention as to who should have her property and when
and on what conditions. Indeed, in the absence of the use
of technical terms in their strict sense, testatrix' intention as
to the legal effect of what she had provided in the will cannot control. That is governed by substantive law. (See
57 Am.Jur. § 1134, p. 729.)
Our search for the intention of Mrs. Stanford as expressed
through her "testamentary scheme or general intention," the
"scheme, plan or dominant purpose" found within the four
corners of the document, requires a close inspection of the
will within its matrix. First we must examine the document
itself. In this instance the terms of the trust as set forth in the
will are quoted verbatim in the decree of partial distribution which evidences the trust; "upon the trusts provided for
by the said last will of Jane L. Stanford, deceased, said trusts
being expressed in said will as follows, namely." In such
situations an interpretation of the decree depends upon the
construction of the will itself. ( lr1 anning v. Bank of California, 216 Cal. 629, 637-638 [15 P.2d 746]; Canfield v.
Security-First Nat. Bank, 13 Cal.2d 1, 18-19 [87 P.2d 830];
Estate of Ryan, 96 Cal.App.2d 787, 791-792 [216 P.2d 497].)
When executing the will Mrs. Stanford had two living
brothers. To one of them, Charles Gardner Lathrop, she gave
a million dollars outright. For the benefit of the other one,
Ariel Lathrop, and the descendants of a deceased brother
Daniel Shields Lathrop she created a trust of two million
dollars. 'l'he income from one-half thereof was to be paid to
Ariel during his lifetime, '' :ud upon his death (as he has no
children or descendants), this trust shall cease and determine
as to one-half of said trust property" and same "shall belong
to and be delivered to his relatives," i.e., one-half to brother
Charles and one-half to descendants of deceased brother
Daniel, in the following shares, viz., one-third to his daughter
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Jennie L. Lawton, one-third to his daughter Amy Gardner
Hansen, and the other one-third in equal shares to Daniel
S. Gunning and Amy L.
grandchildren of said deceased brother Daniel and children of his deceased daughter
Christine L.
Ariel's half of the original trust was
not to remain in trust, but the other half, one million dollars,
was to be held
the trustee for the benefit of the same relatives and in the same
as just outlined. Paragraph
c of section I, above
defines the trust for Amy L.
Hansen. Jennie h Lawton, the other niece, had one child
then living and the trust for her benefit was couched in exactly
the same terms as the one created for Mrs. Hansen and her
child or children. The
for the benefit of the Gunnings ( d of I) is set forth in the margin. 2 A bequest of
$15,000 was made to Miss Bertha Berner, who had been
"Secretary and devoted friend" for nineteen years; five servants were left $1,000 each; charitable gifts of $5,000 and
$10,000 were made to fourteen eleemosynary institutions, an
aggregate of $105,000. Paragraph XIX contains this: "Since
executing former wills, a Kind Providence has brought about
more favorable conditions in the affairs of the Estate left me
by my beloved husband, and for this reason I have greatly
enlarged my gifts to the lJeland Stanford Junior University,
and I now feel justified in enlarging, as I have done in this
Will, my bequests to my relatives and friends and different
charities, which have been ever dear to my heart." Para.. 'To pay over, one-half to each, at regular intervals, to said Daniel
B. Gunning and Amy L. Gunning, the children of my deceased niece
Christine L. Gunning, one-third of the net income arising from said onp
million dollars, the said one-half of said trust property, until such time as
the younger of the two shall reach the age of twenty-five years, at which
time this trust shall cease and determine as to one-third of said one
million dollars the one-half of said trust property, and the said one-third
shall belong to and be delivered to said Daniel S. and Amy L. Gunning.
absolutely and in their own right, share and share alike, and free from
all trusts; provided. however, that if either should die before the
younger attains the age of twenty-five years, this trust shall cease and
determine as to one-half of said one-third of a million dollars and that
proportion of the trust property shall belong to and be delivered to the
children of the one so dying, or, if there be no Ruch children, then to the
other; and the trust shall thereafter continue as to the other one-half of
said one-third of a million dollars until the survivor reaches the age of
twenty-five years, at which time the trust as to the remainder of said
one-third of a million dollars shall cease and determine and the property
shall belong to and be delivered to said survivor, but if such survivor
dies before attaining such age of twenty-five years this trust shall then
cease and determine and the trust property shall belong to and be
delivered to his or her children, or if there be none such, then to his or

her heirs at law."
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graph XXI states that testatrix' silver dinner
service, certain "
of
from
and other silver, are
Trustees,'' and adds: ''
curios, china of rare
vases, clocks, statues of al1
mosaics
of all kinds, marble
to the Trustees from
my home at Palo Alto Farm and San Francisco also included
and to be placed in tl1e Museum as aforesaid named, and I
hereby confirm the
of the articles mentioned in this
Paragraph." The residue of the estate is left to the University in these words: "All the
residue and remainder
of my property and estate, of every kind and nature and
wheresoever situated, not hereinbefore disposed of, I give,
devise and bequeath to the Board of Trustees of the Leland
Stanford Junior University as founded and endowed by my
husband and myself by our joint grant of November eleventh,
1885, recorded in the County of Santa Clara, in Liber 83 of
Deeds, at page 23 et seq., and confirmed by grants dated
December 9th, 1901, to have and to hold to the said Trustees
and to their successors forever as an integral part of the
endowment of the said University, . . . " Then follow requests
that the University trustees preserve certain articles in the
museum, certain ones in the library building, and others in
the memorial room of her husband in the museum building.
Paragraph XXV is the disinheritance provision. It starts
with these words: ''Of the large Estate committed to the
hands of my husband and myself, I have made what I consider the wisest and most just disposition, and the disposition
most in accordance with the cherished wishes long entertained
by my husband and myself, and I shall greatly deplore any
attempt to disturb it;" then it reduces to $100 the share of
any successful or unsuccessful contestant, heir or legatee, and
directs that the balance of such share "that would otherwise
have gone to such person or persons by devise or inheritance
shall pass under the residuary clause of the said Will."
The will, when applied to facts presumptively within the
knowledge of testatrix, indicates that it was not made solely
for the benefit of relatives. The appraised value of the estate
was $3,391,871.32. Three million dollars were left to the
relatives, $125,000 to employees and charities. Under the decree of :final distribution the University as residuary legatee
received $26,003.60 in cash, 200 Northern Pacific Railway
Company bonds having face value of $200,000 (25 of such

bonds were
and other bonds
$1,500 face value; a
total of about $227,500; the exact
does not appear in the record. It is significant that
the contest clause of the will
that the share of one
who attempts to defeat its
in any respect shall be
reduced to $100 and the balance thereof shall go to the
rather than other relatives who have not
to frustrate the testatrix'
for division of her
On
Mrs. Stanford made a holographic
which disposed of items of jewelry that
have been divided among the nieces and greatnieces, but it mentioned no one other than the University. Her
executors were instructed to sell her private car "Stanford,"
certain enumerated valuable jewels and all other jewels not
previously given to the University, and to turn over the proceeds to the trustees of the University "to be held and used
by the said Trustees for said University upon the trusts referred to in the foregoing Will." This later writing plainly
discloses that the will of 1903 had not exhausted Mrs. Stanford's desire to benefit the University and that the phrase of
the will, ''I now feel justified in enlarging, as I have done
in this Will, my bequests to my relatives and friends and
different charities,'' did not imply an intent to do so at the
expense of the University except to the extent therein specifically stated.
Significant and outstanding facts about this will and its
codicil are concern for blood relatives and for the University
which testatrix and her husband had founded. Aside from
said employees and specified charitable institutions there is no
word indicative of a desire to share her fortune with strangers
to the blood. There is nothing to suggest a desire to benefit
adopted children of any of the named relatives, nothing to
show that the subject matter was in her mind at all.
The extrinsic evidence is illuminative upon the dominant
purpose and scheme of the will-to provide for the University
and testatrix' own close relatives.
Her relations with her kindred were not close but were
affectionate; they seem to be included in that sense in the
phrase of the will, "my bequests to my relatives and friends
and different charities, which have been ever dear to my
heart.''
As stated in the will, testatrix and her husband had founded
and endowed the university in 1885, naming it for their only
son who had previously died. In an address to the trustees
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of the
which she made less than a year before
executing the instant will Mrs. Stanford described the basic
purpose of the original endowment and later gifts, saying:
"The moving
of the Founders in the foundation and
endowment of the Leland Stanford Junior University was love
of humanity and a desire to render the greatest possible service to mankind. The
was accordingly designed
for the betterment of mankind morally, spiritually, intellectually, physically and materially. The public at large, and
not alone the comparatively few students who can attend the
University, are the chief and ultimate beneficiaries of the
foundation.''
Thus inspired, this deeply religious woman who acknowledged her gratitude to God in her last will, 3 undertook the
burden which her husband had laid down during or just
before the panic and depression of 1893. He had left $2,500,000 to the university but the closing of his estate was delayed and the money not received until 1898, after the most
crucial needs of that institution had been supplied by the
widow. The estate was involved in litigation with the United
States government and closing was thus delayed. Mrs. Stanford had only the family allowance of $10,000 awarded her
by the probate court. She had to close down ''a great vineyard in Tehama County" known as the Vina ranch, sold
many fine horses, closed her city home, dismissed all servants
except Ah Wing (who was her servant for 20 years before
the will was made). To obtain action upon the government
lawsuit she journeyed to Washington and laid that case and
the exigencies of the University before President Cleveland.
who forthwith expedited the hearing of the lawsuit for her.
She wrote him a letter expressing her gratitude, which contained the following look at the future: "Since my visit to
Washington I have decided to keep the doors open of the University another year hopeing and trusting in an all Wise God
that it will go on as long as the State of California exists."
'ro Governor Budd she described her action and her motives
in a letter which says: "I felt it a sacred duty to my husband,
my son, and the blessed work to lay before the President and
the Attorney General the desperate struggle I had made to
3
' ' I wish thus publicly to acknowledge my great gratitude to an all·
wise, loving Heavenly Father for His sustaining grace through the past
ten years of bereavements, trial and disappointments. In all I have leaned
hard on this Great Comforter and found rest and peace. I have no doubt
about a future life beyond this; a fair land where no more tears will
be shed and no more partings had."
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Father's
in my
disheartened until I learned the Government
years. Under such adverse circumstances I was unable
reengage the President and faculty
for another year, for I have no
fortune and I had,
all my
expenses, sold all
as far as
I
and
Courts allowed me, for its maintenance the
This has cost me a struggle far
beyond the world's
and to fail now meant giving
up all I live for." In a letter of 1896 she described the University as ''the Institution which was so dear to the heart of
my husband and dearer still to me because of the great burdens which I have had to carry in order to insure its existence." During one period she gave regularly to the University $10,000 a month but its expenses wer0 $19,000 and
she managed somehow to supply the other $9,000. In 1897 she
gave her home and contents to the University, subject to a reserved life estate. In June of that year she donated to it
bonds having face value of $900,000. These latter gifts were
made contrary to her attorney's advice and she wrote to
President David Starr ,Jordan in August, 1897, saying: "I am
only anxious to furnish you with funds to pay the needs required. I could live on bread and water to do this my part,
and would feel that God and my beloved ones in the life beyond this, smiled on effort;;: made to ensure the future of my
dear husband's work to better humanity." In December,
1898, she wrote Dr. ,Jordan again, saying: "You know dear
trusted friend that every dollar I can rightfully call mine is
sacredly laid on the Alter of my love the University, and
thus it will ever be.''
In May, 1899. coincident with large gifts of land to the
University she made an address to the trustees containing
these words: ''Being of sound and disposing mind and
memory, and mindful of the uncertainty of life, I deem it
to be my sacred duty to so put my house in order that when
I am called hence from mortal life, I can feel that I have done
all that I could to further advance and insure the future
of the great work which was so sacredly left to my care."
At about that same time an instrument of gift to the university carried this
: "Of tlw large Estate committed to the keeping of my husband and myself, I have
made what I consider the wisest and most just disposition,
and the disposition most in accordance with cherished wishes
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long entertained
my husband and myself." The opening
expression of paragraph XXV of the will of 1903 is in almost
identical language. In July, 1900, Mrs. Stanford gave the
University certain bonds having face value of $12,426,000.
Just as courts consider oral evidence of affection for the
natural objects of a testator's bounty, or lack of such affection, in determining the
intent of language used in
his will, so it is proper to eonsider here this background
of affectionate concern of testatrix for the University which
to her stood as a monument to her deceased husband and her
only son and as an outlet for her own desire to serve her
God and humanity. It has a direct bearing upon the general
scheme and plan of her will. This evidence and the inferences
deducible from it stand uncontradicted and it cannot be said
fairly that this will bears any connotation of a desire to
benefit any stranger (except the designated servants and
charities), or any adoptee whose artificial status Mrs. Stanford had no occasion to anticipate. Subject to the specified
exceptions (servants and charities) the scheme of this will is
provision for blood relatives and for testatrix' beloved university. An actual intention to provide for persons such as
a legatee of Walter Hansen, or an adoptee of Mrs. Hansen,
cannot be read into this will which, to say the least, is absolutely silent on these subjects. How then does the matter
stand as one of substantive law? Is there some construction
which the law imposes upon the testatrix' expression of intent nolens volens T
It cannot be denied that this gift to Mrs. Hansen for life
with remainder to her "child or children" is a class gift.
"As to a gift to a class the ru1e is stated as follows: 'In legal
contemplation a gift to a class is a gift of an aggregate sum
to a body of persons uncertain in number at the time of the
gift, to be ascertained at a future time, who are all to take in
equal or some other definite proportions, the share of each
being dependent for its amount upon the ultimate number.' "
(Estate of Mwrphy, 157 Cal. 63, 67 [106 P. 230, 137 Am.St.
Rep. 110].) The Restatement of the Law of Property, § 279,
comment a, at page 1453, says: "The intention of the conveyor
that there be the possibility of fluctuation in the number of
takers is the factor which differentiates a class gift from a
gift to individuals singly.'' Nor is there any dissent among
the authorities from the proposition that a class gift automatically opens to receive and benefit new members, e.g., a
child of a life tenant born after the testatrix' demise. But
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of whether the death
a class member before
time for distribution terminates his interest and thus enlarges
those of the survivors there is a
of judicial exEnlargement of the class and shrinking of its
present two different questions.
Subsection 2 of section 296 of the Restatement
says: ''Prom the fact that a class can increase in "'"·''"'v~·
until a certain future
no inference should be made that
such members of the class as survive to such future date
become distributees." The first rule (opening for new members) is
settled as a matter of law. But the
effect of a decrease in membership of a class has not crystallized into an inflexible rule of substantive law. "\Vhether a
remainder vests in designated persons in their individual
right, or whether it passes to members of a class taking as a
group which is to be fixed and determined in the future,
is a matter of testamentary intention which must be ascertained from the text of the whole will viewed in the light of
the surrounding circumstances. . . . There is no judicially
approved formula either of text or attending circumstances
that will in every case solve the problem; each will must be
construed upon its own particular language and against its
peculiar background." (In re Cameron's Estate (Surr.Ct.
N.Y.), 66 N.Y.S.2d 763, 764.) In the present state of the
authorities the effect of a decrease in class membership presents primarily a question of the testator's intent that survivorship be a condition precedent or subsequent to one's
beneficial enjoyment as a class member.
Discussion of the problem in terms of contingent or vested
remainder is not conducive to enlightenment. Mr. Justice
Cardozo, in New York Life Ins. & Trust Co. v. Winthrop,
237 N.Y. 93 [142 N.E. 431, 432, 41 A.L.R. 791], said: "When
we speak in this connection of the vesting of an interest,
we mean, of course, a vesting that is absolute and finaL The
statutory definition of vested and contingent estates sheds
little light upon the problem, for an estate may be vested
within the definition of the statute, though defeasible by death
before the moment of division. [Citations.] The only significant distinction for the purpose now in view is between an
estate that is absolute and one subject to conditions." Gray
on The Rule Against Perpetuities, Second Edition, section
llOa, page 83, says: ''The placing this class of remainders
under the head of vested remainders is to some extent artificial," and in section 205a, at page 171 : "Though the interest
is called vested, it is in truth contingent."
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Section 296
the
at page
says: '(1)
A '
taker' under the terms of a limitation in favor of
class described
' . . . of a
person is
a distributee of the subject matter of
such class
he fails to survive to the time to
he
survive
the terms of the limita" At page 1609 "When the
matter of the class
"'""'"','"'t" sum. the exclusion of a '
taker'
of one of the rules stated in the Clauses of
Subseetion (1) increases the share of each distributee under
such limitation not thus excluded
T11nstrations 1 and 6).
Herein lies one of the
importances of construing the
limitation to be in favor of a class rather than in favor of
individuals
Introductory Note to this Chapter,
third paragraph)." At page 1611. comment f: "It is immaterial under the rule stated in Clause (b) of Subsection
) whether this requirement of survival is imposed as a
condition precedent of the interest created or as a defeasibility
thereof operative upon the failure of such person to survive. ••
Simes & Smith, on the Law of Putnre Interests (2d ed.),
section 640, page 78: "Where a gift to a class is postponed,
far as distribution is concerned, until the termination of
a prior life estate, it is clear that the general rule of construction would permit the class to increase until the end of
the life estate, but would exclude all members of the class who
were not in being at the termination of the life estate. Such,
in fact, is the common result, with reference to gifts of both
personalty and realty. Such an application gives effect to the
probable desire of the transferor to include as many members
as possible and to the principle of convenience in closing the
class when the time has come for distribution." Section 652,
page 103: " . . . Phrased in another way, the question is
whether there is any requirement of survival to a particular
point of time. In many of the cases, the question is frequently
discussed in terms of whether the gift is vested or contingent
-it being assumed by the court that if the gift is vested there
is no requirement of survival. and that if it is contingent
there is a requirement of survival. We have already seen,
however, that analysis in such terms tends to obscure the real
issue, since it is possible for a vestrd interest to be subject
to a requirement of survival in the form of a condition subsequent, and it is also possible to have a contingent interest
which is transmissible and which does not terminate with the
death of the owner thereof."
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It is also important in considering this subject to differentiate those cases which deal with gifts to a class consisting
of testator's own children or grandchildren and those in favor
of a class composed of the children of some other person, such
as a collateral relative, which is the instant case. Equally
important is the differentiation of those cases dealing with
a class which has not been exhausted as to membership. The
cases dealing with these two categories often arrive at a
conclusion of indefeasible vesting, this on the basis of a
presumed or inferred intention of the testator. In considering the claims of Mrs. Barton, apart from those of respondent
adoptees, we deal with a class whose membership had been
exhausted prior to the time for distribution. We shall for
the present discuss this aspect of the case.
Mrs. Stanford's will plainly shows that she wanted the
University to have anything that would not pass to the persons and in the manner specified in that instrument; this
through the gift of the residue and the disinheritance clause
above quoted. If a condition of survivorship of Walter L.
Hansen was essential to that end then such survivorship was
an implied term of the will. To infer that testatrix intended
Walter to be able to substitute some stranger as the recipient
of a third of a million dollars of her property is to my mind
too legalistic. 4 There is not a scintilla of evidence that Mrs.
Stanford actually intended any stranger to take any part
of the Hansen trust through any device or in any circumstances whatever.
The suggestion that Mrs. Stanford probably foresaw the
possibility that Walter Hansen would predecease his mother
leaving issue surviving him, that she would not want to cut
such issue off or treat them differently from the issue of her
niece Christine L. Gunning, that therefore there was no implied condition of survivorship attached to the gift to Walter
Hansen. does not find support in the will or any other evidence. Subdivision d of I of the will, which immediately
follows the Amy L. Hansen trust, deals with the descendants
• All presumptions and constructional preference rules must yield to
ascertained intention of the testatrix. "The paramount rule in the
construction of wills, to which all other rules must yield, is that a will
is to be construed according to the intention of the testator as expressed
therein, and this intention must be given effect as far as possible. (Civ.
Code,~~ 1317, 1318.) Statutory rules of interpretation are to be followed
insofar as they aid in determining the intention of the testator, but they
are all subject to the fundamental rule that the intention 1M shown by the
will must prevail." (Estate of Wilson, 184 Cal. 63, 66-67 (193 P. 581].)

Sept.1957]

ESTATE OF STANFORD
(49 C.2d 120: 315 P.2d 681]

155

of the deceased niece Christine L. Gunning; it plainly contemplates death of a grandniece or grandnephew without surviving issue for it says so,-"or, if there be no such children,
then to the other" and "shall belong to and be delivered to
his or her children, or if there be none such, then to his or
her heirs at law." If, as asserted, Mrs. Stanford had in mind
the possibility of Walter's demise leaving issue, her failure
to mention that event in the preceding paragraph c is highly
significant as a showing of deliberation in refraining from any
further disposition than one ''to the child or children of said
Amy L. Hansen." Moreover, the intention which courts must
seek in construing a decedent's will is intent with respect
to the facts to which it must be applied, intent with respect
to things that have happened, not those that never occurred.
If the interest of Walter L. Hansen in the trust be viewed
as contingent, subject to condition precedent that he survive
distribution, it lapsed upon his death (Estate of Easter, 24
Cal.2d 191 [148 P.2d 601]), and fell into the residue. If it
be viewed as a vested interest it was vested subject to defeasance. All vested class interests are subject to partial
defeasance upon entrance of a new member into the class
and are subject to complete defeasance where the class membership is exhausted and testator's intention that the gift
shall thereupon fall into the residue is fairly apparent.
For convenience the rule of section 296 of the Restatement
is again quoted : " ( 1) A 'possible taker' under the terms
of a limitation in favor of a class described as 'children,' . . .
of a designated person is excluded from being a distributee
of the subject matter of such class gift if . . . (b) he fails to
survive to the time to which he is required to survive by the
terms of the limitation. " 5 This has been recognized in this
state as sound doctrine. The latest pronouncement on the
subject which was in existence at the time of Mrs. Stanford's
making her will was that of Estate of Cavarly, 119 Cal. 406,
410 [51 P. 629] : "It is the rule that when a testamentary
disposition is made to a class, and possession is postponed, it
includes all persons within the class at the time to which pos.
"The Restatement amplifies this at page 1610 by this illustration: "1.
A has a son B who has children C and D. A, owning Blackacre in fee
simple absolute, executes an otherwise effective will devising Blackacre
'to B for life and thereafter to the children of B in fee simple absolute.'
C dies. A dies and his will is duly probated. C is excluded from being
a distributee of Blackacre. B dies. In the absence of an applicable laps<•
statute (see § 298) D acquires an estate in fee simple absolute in the
whole of Blaekacre.''
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a class that
who are in existence at the time of the distribution.
on Perpetuities, sec. 698.) '' 6
Estate of Clark, 64
636
P.2d 465] (hearing
denied), dealt with a trust for the benefit of Walter C.
a
of
same to go upon his death to his "surviving lawful issue.'' Miller died
three children; one
of
Miller
died later
two
adopted children but no issue of her body. Held that the
adopted children could not take and that the other children
of Walter C. Miller would take to the exclusion of Mrs.
Dorstewitz' heirs because she did not have a vested, indefeasable estate. The opinion says, at page 641 : "A gift to a
class is a gift of an aggregate sum to a body of persons uncertain in number to be ascertained at a future time, all
to take in some definite proportions, the amount of the share
of each being dependent upon the ultimate number of the
class. ( 6 Jarman on Wills, § 232; Rest., Law of Property,
p. 1451.) When members of a class pass on, the surviving
members take to the exclusion of the devisees or heirs at law
of such deceased member. (3 Page on Wills, Lifetime ed.,
§ 1058.) Thereby, the share of a deceased member increases
the share of the survivors of the group. (In re Wood's
Estate, 321 Pa. 497 [184 A. 13].)" And at page 642: "The
class is to be ascertained when the duty arises to convey and
deliver, and survivorship at that time is one of the conditions of the gift . . . . A gift to 'surviving lawful issue' is not
to individuals named but to a class of designated persons
the members of which are to be ascertained either at the death
of the specified beneficiary or at the time of distribution."
Essentially, In re Winter, 114 Cal. 186, 190 [45 P. 1063],
and Estate of Hartson, 218 Cal. 536, 539-541 [24 P.2d 171],
stand for the principles voiced in the Clark case, supra.
Perusal of them will disclose that emphasis is laid upon the
intention of the testator in each instance. While the language
of California decisions which are said to be to the contrary is
not wholly reconcilable with these cases, the quest for intention of a testator is a common thread which pervades all
of them and in a broad sense makes them harmonious. Estate
of Blake, 157 Cal. 448, 458 [108 P. 287]: "There is no subject

•n is immaterial that the citation of § 698 of Gray on Perpetuities may
not support the statement for which it is cited. The text announced the
law of this state.
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in the law to which more refinement of learning has been
particularly in ascertaining whether
a remainder is a
or vested one, more nice, technical,
rules of construction have been formulated . . . .
are
subordinate rules of construction which are
only in the absence of all other indications in the
will to the
and in support of au intention on the
of the testator to crt>ate a vested remainder." This rule
of the Clark and similar cases, if accepted as one of constructional preference in aid of effcetuating the testator's intent,
is undoubtedly sound law. It would be a futile task to attempt to reconcile all our California decisions upon the subject, but referenee win be made to several which are said
to be opposed to the cases above discussed.
Estate of Backesto, 71 Cal.App. 409 [235 P. 670]. Testator left his wife a life estate in all his property and directed
that upon her death the property be sold and the proceeds
divided equally among children of certain of his brothers
and sisters-all except his brother Henry's children who
should take half as much as the others. Testator's brother
Jacob had a daughter, Irene Seton, who died before testator's wife. Irene's daughter, Sadie Seton Wagner, was excluded from the distribution made by the trial court and
she appealed. The ruling was made upon the theory that the
gifts did not vest until the death of testator's wife. The
appellate court held that a class gift vests at the testator's
death and opens as ne1v 1:1embers eome into being though
possession is postponed. It assumed this vesting to be determinative of the case and on that basis reversed the judgment; it did not discuss the matter of a defeasance of a
vested interest or any implication of survivorship. For these
reasons it cannot be ("ciiSidered as controlling at bar.
Estate of Norris, 78 Cal.App.2d 152 [177 P.2d 299]. Testatrix had one son, Frederic King, whose wife was Edith Bos.well King. They had three children, Boswell F. King, Thomas
S. King and William N. King. William died before either
of his parents, leaving his wife Margaret W. King surviving
him. Testatrix' will set up certain trusts which were to
terminate upon the death of both Frederic and his wife Edith.
'rhereupon, the trustee was to "grant and deliver" the trust
estate, share and share alike, to the children of Frederic and
Edith "or their legal heirs by right of representation," i.e.,
the legal heirs of said children. The will also provided that
any other child born to Frederic and Edith should share in
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the trust with the same rights as children previously named.
The decree of distribution departed somewhat from this
language (see p. 157), providing for delivery of the trust
property ''unto the children, share and share alike, or their
legal heirs by right of representation, of the said" Frederic
and Edith. Appellants Boswell F. King and Thomas S. King
claimed the entire trust estate on the theory that William N.
King's death before termination of the trust ended his interest therein; that survivorship was of the essence of the
class gift because the remainders were contingent and not
vested (p. 157). Respondent contended that the interests
were vested and only possession was postponed. The reviewing court held that the remainders were vested and the fact
that the class would open for new members was not inconsistent with that conclusion. The question presented in the
instant case was not considered in Norris. Indeed, the terms
of the will provided for deceased class members by directing
that their shares should go to their legal heirs. The court
said, at page 160: ''If the decree is fairly clear without resort
to rules of constructional preference then, of course, such
rules need not be considered. Many times these rules of construction are resorted to as a form of rationalization, that is,
to justify a construction already made.'' At page 161 : ''The
law is well settled that vested remainders can be created in
a class the membership of which is not complete at the effective date of the grant or devise, so that similar vested interests accrue to those who, by later entry therein, fall within
the class. . . . In such a case the remainders could well be
vested in the three children of Frederic and Edith, and, had
there been any later entrants into the class (there were not),
their interests would have vested as they were born, and by
virtue of the consequent increase in the class membership,
the vested interests of the preceding members would have
been proportionately diminished. It is well settled that the
fact that the interests of existing members of the class may be
thus diminished does not convert the interest of such members to contingent remainders. In such event the remainders
are vested subject to a condition subsequent." The author
of the Norris opinion referred to it in Leonardini v. Wells
Fargo Bank, 131 Cal.App.2d 9, 15 [280 P.2d 81, 49 A.L.R.2d
1085], as follows: "The parties seem agreed that the interest
of appellant was vested, and base that conclusion on Estate
of Norris, 78 Cal.App.2d 152 [177 P.2d 299]. Undoubtedly
this court held in that case that a decree of distribution
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which provided that a gift, after a life estate, to the children
'or their legal heirs by right of representation,' created a
vested remainder in the children. The quoted phrase is, of
course, equivalent to 'or his heirs' found in the present case.
But the court did not hold that in every case the quoted
phrase made the remainder a vested one, but held that under
all the provisions of the decree of distribution, discussed at
length in the opinion, an intent appeared to make the remainder vested. The cases ori this subject are in hopeless
conflict and seldom, if ever, turn solely upon the words 'or
his heirs' or their equivalent. The great majority of them
turn upon all of the provisions of the trust, the courts trying
to ascertain the intent of the testator. (See anno. 128 A.L.R.
306.)"
Whether a class member's survival of the life tenant is a
condition subsequent upon nonoccurrence of which a vested
interest is terminated is not answered by a mere holding that
that future estate is vested, but turns upon the intention of
the testatrix. In this case it appears to be the sound conclusion
that survival of the life tenant is a condition subsequent attached to the estate vested in a class member; a total failure of
class members to survive the life tenant causes the gift to lapse
and fall into the residue. To hold that Walter Hansen had
an estate which could be alienated and which would survive
the life tenant after his own death opens the way for injecting into the class strangers to the blood, people whom the
testatrix had no possible intention of benefiting. There is no
evidence of substantiality tending to establish an affirmative
or any intention of testatrix that anyone other than Walter
L. Hansen or the University should enjoy the benefit of the
remainder of the Hansen trust.
The trial court properly held that Walter L. Hansen had
no estate which he could will to Mrs. Barton, and that his
interest in the trust lapsed upon his death. That the ruling
may have been based upon the faulty view that Walter had
only a contingent estate, in the sense of one subject to a condition precedent, does not affect the soundness of the decision.
Appellant Barton contends that the determination of this
law question has been concluded by the ruling in an early
proceeding to which the University was a party. As above
shown, testatrix created a trust for her niece, Jennie L. Lawton, in the same language as that used in the case of Amy L.
Hansen. Mrs. Lawton had one son who survived testatrix
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but died without issue
mother.
She died
thereafter and her executor
for
distribution to her
of the son's interest in the Stanford trust estate.
contested but the court
made the order as
1927. The University
to this court.
was dismissed
to
claim cannot be
sustained for several reasons.
There was no
of res
in the trial court and
the case was not tried upon the theory of the existence of such
an issue. Counsel's argument here is based upon Southern
Pac. Co. v. City of Los Angeles, 5 Ca1.2d 545, 548 [55 P.2d
847], a case which does not consider res judicata. Indeed,
counsel's contention is that conflicting decisions with respect
to the two trusts "creates an anomalous situation in a cw1e
wherein diametrically opposite conclusions are reached as to
the legal effect of the same essential facts, similarly presented,
but applied to different individuals." The cited case was one
of two lawsuits which this court brought together for contemporaneous disposition in order to avoid divergent results
flowing from identical facts and law questions. That precedent was strictly limited in Dillard v. McKnight, 34 Cal.2d
209, 224 [209 P.2d 387, 11 A.L.R.2d 835], to situations where
both judgments are before the court and the essential facts
in each case are similarly presented and in most particulars
undisputed.
The dismissal of the University's appeal from the Lawton
ruling was based upon a stipulation and was made without
any inquiry by this court into the merits of the case. Hence
it affords no basis for a plea of res judicata. Under such circumstances it is ''an affirmance of the judgment only in a
limited sense . . . . At the most, the dismissal prevents a
second appeal, and relieves the order or judgment from attack for error or irregularity which could have been taken
ndvantage of upon appeal." (Sullivan v. Gage, 145 Cal.
759, 770 [79 P. 537].) To the same effect is H award v.
Howard, 87 Cal.App. 20, 27 [261 P. 714], which says: "In
our opinion a dismissal of an appeal by the supreme r•ourt
or district court of appeal for the reason that the appeal
has not been prosecuted as required by statute and the rules
governing appeals operate as an affirmance only to the extent
of precluding further appeal and leaves the judgment appealed from unimpaired. No court is permitted to pass upon
issues not before it for determination; and when the appel-
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late court in its order of
concludes that there is no
question
to it for hearing, and in effect that the
appellate jurisdiction has not been invoked, it would seem
difficult to say that this is a solemn judgment, per se, determining the questions which the court refuses to consider."
After a judgment has been affirmed on appeal it is the judgnot the affirmance, which affords basis for the plea of
res judicata. An affirmance merely supplies the quality of
finality to the judgment.
The court erred in finding that the respondents, as adopted
children of Mrs. Hansen, became members of the class "child
or children'' and take the trust estate as sole surviving members thereof.
Upon this issue expressed testamentary intent controls, not
some inflexible rule of substantive law. This is settled by
Estate of Pierce, 32 Cal.2d 265 [196 P.2d 1], wherein the
question was whether the term "children (lawful issue) " as
used in the will in relation to collateral relatives included
or excluded adopted children. In rejecting the contention
that the inheritance statute (Prob. Code, § 257) controlled
the decision the court said, at pages 268-270: ''Even though
an adopted child has a status with respect to its adoptive
parent identical to that of a child born of such parent and
succeeds to the estate of an adoptive parent in the same manner as a child born of such parent, it does not follow that
such status is determinative in construing the terms of a will.
It is fundamental in the interpretation of wills that the
testator's intent be derived from the language of the will
itself and, under Probate Code, section 105, when an uncertainty appears upon the face of the will, from the circumstances under which it was executed. . . . In the determination of the rights of an adopted child under a will, the controlling question is not whether the adopted child would inherit from its adoptive parent under the statute of succession, but whether the adopted child is included among the
persons the testator intended to share in his estate. . . .
When statutes like section 108 are not applicable, the rules of
intestate succession apply only if the testator expresses an
intention in the will to adopt such rules." It was held that
parol evidence was properly received and that the court on
that basis correctly adjudged the adopted children to be excluded from the class gift in that instance.
Concerning adopted children the Restatement says in sec49C.2d~
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tion 287 (page 1520) : "(1) When a limitation is in favor
of the 'children' of a designated person, all persons adopted
by the designated person are excluded from the possible takers
thereunder except when a contrary intent of the conveyor is
found from additional language or circumstances."
Comment a at page 1521: "The rule stated in this Section
narrows the group of 'possible takers' under a limitation in
favor of the 'children of B' by normally eliminating all children adopted by B. Historically, the word 'children' did not
include anyone except issue of the body of the designated
parent. No legal method for the adoption of children existed.
. . . This historically derived restriction upon the inclusiveness of the term continues, except when a 'contrary intent of
the conveyor is found from additional language or circumstances.' This continuance finds justification in the obvious
fact that the conveyor normally does not desire the designated
parent to have power, by adopting any person he may choose,
in effect to appoint the subject matter of the conveyance to
such person. "
Comment c, page 1522: "The situation most commonly
within the stated exclusionary rule exists when A executes
a conveyance containing a limitation in favor of the 'children
of B,' and B adopts a child subsequent to the time when A
has lost the power to alter or to eliminate this limitation, as
for example, when A, being a testator, has died."
Estate of Clark, supra, 64 Cal.App.2d 636, 643 [149 P.2d
465] : "Under these decisions, Mrs. Dorstewitz could not have
been vested with an 'indefeasible estate,' for the reason that
she had died before the termination of the trust. Hence
her estate could not pass to her adopted children. Under the
rule of those cases the legatee class at Margaret's death included only the surviving, consanguineal posterity of Walter
C. Miller. (33 C.J. p. 817; Bouvier.)" See also 1 Am.Jur.
§ 64, p. 665; 95 C.J.S. § 653, p. 954; Annos, in 70 A.L.R.
621 and 144 A.L.R. 670.
On the question of Mrs. Stanford's intention it should be
recognized first that this class gift does not run to her own
children but to those of a collateral relative. One w'ho takes
a child into her home through the formal process of adoption
looks upon her thenceforth as if she were natural b01:n, confers on her all the rights of a natural child, and assumes
toward her all the obligations owed to issue of her own body.
When she speaks of her children a natural inference arises
lhat she includes the adopted one. But the situation is dif-
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ferent with respect to the adoptee of a collateral relative.
With that artificial relationship testatrix has nothing to do;
toward that child she has assumed no obligation; when she
refers to the children of that relative there is no natural basis
for an inference that she has the adopted child in mind. If
Mrs. Hansen could bring other relatives, such as Mrs. Reynolds, into the trust through the adoption process, she could
include strangers in the same way.
The will was made in 1903, when Mrs. Hansen was 37 years
of age and her son Walter 13. She had demonstrated her
ability to reproduce and there was no reason to anticipate
that there would be any need or occasion for adoption. The
record is barren of any evidence that the subject had ever
been discussed or that testatrix had any basis for inferring
that an adoption would or might take place. It did not
occur until 19 years after her death, or until after Walter
had attempted to pass his interest to Mrs. Barton, a complete
stranger to Mrs. Stanford. The adoptees in this instance
were an adult woman and her two minor daughters. Prior
to Mrs. Stanford's death California law did not permit the
adoption of an adult. (Estate of Taggart, 190 Cal. 493,
498 [213 P. 504, 27 A.L.R. 1360] .) The law was changed
in this respect in 1951. ( Civ. Code, § 221; 2 Cal.Jur.2d § 8,
p. 422.) If Mrs. Stanford be presumed to know the law, 7
that knowledge could not extend to the statutes of New York,
which did permit the adoption of adults and which was invoked by Mrs. Hansen in this instance.
The will being silent on the subject, there is no basis for
inferring an intent to include adopted children in the class
"child or children" unless it be found in testatrix' letter of
1897 written to Dr. David Starr Jordan, president of the
University. This was seven years before the making of her
will. Briefly, it explains the circumstances of taking a niece,
Jennie L. Lathrop, into her home as a baby and thereafter
caring for her at different periods; refers to her husband's
opposition thereto and further says : ''Some might think it
was adoption which we both felt could never be-and we both
felt that our heart's best love had been given, never to be
replaced by any other love for any but our dear son." Also,
"I must be guarded and careful to let the world and the dear
child herself know that I had never adopted her . . . . She
'It is doubtful that there is any such presumption. See Murphy v. SkefteE, 121 Cal.App. 533, 538 [9 P.2d 568],
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knows full well her true
that she has not been adopted
by me and never can be. And in all my conversations with
her Father and my brother Charles G. Lathrop I have endeavored to impress upon him this fact that I did not look
upon dear Jennie as my child.'' The trial judge found on the
basis of this letter that '
to execution of her said will,
said decedent understood
and
that the effect
of adoption was to put the child
on the same footing
as a natural child ; in using the term 'child or children' of
Aimee L. Hanson, said decedent intended to include and did
include therein any child or children lawfully adopted by
Aimee L. Hanson." The letter warrants no such inferences.
The most that can be inferred therefrom is that Mrs. Stanford
understood that one who claimed to be her adopted daughter
might be treated as a pretermitted heir and take a child's
share in her estate in the absence of provision for her in her
will. That she also thought that an adopted child of a niece
would be entitled to any part of her own estate or that her
silence on the subject would bring that child into her class
gift is sheer speculation, a mere possibility and no more.
Possibilities cannot afford legal basis for an inference of fact.
(Robinson v. Board of Retirement, 140 Cal.App.2d 115, 118
[294 P.2d 724]; 18 Cal.Jur.2d § 60, p. 479.) Of course, when
the trier of facts attempts to build inference upon inference,
the first or basic one must be permissible or the whole structure collapses. (18 Cal.Jur.2d § 61, p. 481 ;Vaccarezza v.
Sanguinetti, 71 Cal.App.2d 687, 698 [163 P.2d 470] .) Fundamentally this communication is opposed to the claims of
adopted children to share in an estate when not specifically
included in a will. The letter under discussion says: "I
make this explicit explanation in this letter to you that you
may hold it sacred and if after my eyes are closed to life
here, hands are folded and my work finished the subject
would be discussed whether or not Jennie L. Lathrop had
been adopted, you can use this letter and defend me." As a
matter of law this letter affords no basis for the inferences
drawn by the trial judge and furnishes no support to the
claims of respondents. This is not a case of a finding based
upon conflicting substantial evidence, but one of absence of
any competent evidence to support the finding. The record
affords no legal basis :for the conclusion that the adoptees,
respondents herein, became members of the class "child or
children'' of Amy L. Hansen, or that they are entitled to any
portion of Mrs. Stanford's estate.
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the alternative argument that, asto be
''a
over then
arises by
to the surviving issue of Daniel Lathrop
in equal shares per stirpes.'' They identify Mrs. Reynolds as
such, she being the last surviving grandchild of Daniel
Lathrop.
Counsel
upon such cases as Brock v. Hall, 33 Cal.2d
885 [206 P.2d
11 A.L.R.2d 672], which states the doctrine
as follows: ''The implication of gifts in wills rests upon the
primary rule of construction that the duty of the court in all
cases of interpretation is to ascertain the intention of the
maker from the instrument read as a whole and to give effect
thereto if possible, and it is well settled that, where the intention to make a gift clearly appears in a will, although
perhaps imperfectly expressed, the court will raise a gift
by implication. [P. 887.] . . . When the intention to make a
gift clearly appears from the instrument taken by its four
corners and read as a whole, considering its general scheme,
the property involved, and the persons named as beneficiaries,
the gift may be implied. (Estate of Franck, 190 Cal. 28, 31
[210 P. 417] .) Although the court may not indulge in conjecture or speculation simply because the instrument seems
to have omitted something which it is reasonable to suppose
should have been provided, a gift will be raised by necessary
implication where a reading of the entire instrument produces
a conviction that a gift was intended. [P. 889.] . . . Accordingly, in ascertaining the intention of the trustor the court is
not limited to determining what is meant by any particular
phrase but may also consider the necessary implication arising
from the language of the instrument as a whole." [P. 890.]
Mrs. Reynolds was given outright a share of Ariel's trust
(above described) upon his death, some $81,250, and has received her share of the corpus and accumulated income of
the trust created by subdivision d of part I of the will, the
sum of $325,000; a grand total of $406,250. Subdivision d
contains gifts over, while the one creating Amy Hansen's
trust (immediately preceding d) stops short of that and
certainly does not imply a gift over in favor of Mrs. Reynolds
with respect to the Hansen trust. The discussion of Mrs.
Stanford's intention concerning adopted children, supra,
views the will ''taken by its four corners and read as a whole,
considering its general scheme, the property involved, and
the persons named as beneficiaries" (quoting Brock v. Hall,
supra, p. 889), and establishes without necessity of repetition
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or further elaboration that Mrs. Stanford had no intention
to give the remainder of the Hansen trust to Mrs. Reynolds
in preference and to the exclusion of the University. The
implied gift argument cannot prevail.
The judgment should be affirmed as to that portion which
decrees that appellant Barton is not entitled to take, but
should be reversed in other respects with instructions to
enter judgment distributing to the Board of Trustees of the
Leland Stanford Junior University the entire trust estate
created by subdivision c of section I of the will of testatrix.
Shenk, J., and McComb, J., concurred.
The petition of appellant Board of Trustees of The Leland
Stanford Junior University for a rehearing was denied October 16, 1957. Ashburn, J. pro tern.,* participated therein in
place of Spence, J. Shenk, J., McComb, J., and Ashburn, J.
pro tern., • were of the opinion that the petition should be
granted.
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STEPHEN M. KOVACIK, Respondent, v. HENRY E.
REED, Appellant.
[1] Joint Adventurers- Profits and Losses.-Generally, in the
absence of an agreement to the contrary the law presumes
that partners and joint adventurers intended to participate
equally in the profits and losses of the common enterprise,
irrespective of any inequality in the amounts each contributed
to the capital employed in the venture, with the losses being
shared by them in the same proportions as they share the
profits.
[2] !d.-Profits and Losses.-Where one partner or joint adventurer contributes the money capital as against the other's skill
and labor, neither party is liable to the other for contribution
for any loss sustained; on loss of the money the party who
contributed it is not entitled to recover any part of it from
the party who contributed only services.
[1] See Cal.Jur.2d, Joint Adventurers, § 13; Am.Jur., Joint
Adventurers, § 12.
McK. Dig. References: [1-3] Joint Adventurers, § 8; [4] Appeal
and Error, § 1105.1.
*Assigned by Chairman of Judicial Council.

